





























                                                          




 Until recently, the law pertaining to jus quaesitum tertio in Scotland was regarded as 
problematic.1 It was said to be ‘behind the times’,2 not least for the fact that the archaic Latin 
epitaph served to obfuscate the practical utility of ‘third party rights’.3 In 2016, the Scottish 
Law Commission noted that ‘[C]lear, readily comprehensible terms are likely to benefit… the 
many people who draft and interpret contracts’4 and consequently recommended that steps 
ought to be taken to ‘modernise’ not only the substance of the law in this area,5 but also the 
language used to express that law.6 To that end, the Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) 
Act 2017 was passed by the Scottish Parliament. 
It is difficult to take issue with the admirable aims of this legislation. Indeed, poor 
lawyer-client communication remains the most commonly cited cause of complaint concerning 
solicitors in Scotland7 and so any move to combat the use of unnecessary legalese should be 
applauded. With that said, this article will present something of a defence of the practice of 
referring to certain legal terms in Latin formally for the simple fact that doing so keeps alive, 
for the Scots scholar and lawyer, the link between the past and the present of Scots law. 
Seemingly ‘archaic’ terms, such as jus quaesitum tertio, embody a rich history which no 
modern English term can hope to capture. This, as shall be shown, is of immense benefit to 
both jurists and legal practitioners.  
This paper seeks to mount its defence by considering three particular difficulties with 
the theoretical operation of the common law doctrine of jus quaesitum tertio in Scotland.8 
These issues were noted by the Scottish Law Commission9 and thus form part of the framework 
which drove the impetus to reform. The first of these issues concerned the creation of jura 
quaesitum tertio which served to benefit unborn children. Since the existence of a right is 
contingent on the existence of a ‘person’ who is the beneficiary of that right,10 the fact that two 
contracting parties could lawfully create a jus quaesitum tertio to benefit an unborn child – a 
legal non-person – seemed incongruous with the contemporary understanding of what a legal 
‘right’ is.11 
                                                          
1 See Lorna MacFarlane, Third Party Rights: Behind the Times, (04/09/2013), JLSS  
2 Douglas Mathie, Third-party rights – Scots Law stuck in the 17 Century, August 2010, accessible at: 
https://brodiestechblog.wordpress.com/2010/08/26/third-party-rights-%E2%80%93-scots-law-stuck-in-the-
17thcentury/ 
3 MacFarlane, Third Party Rights, (2013); Scottish Law Commission, Review of Contract Law Report on Third 
Party Rights, [2016] (Scot. Law Com. No 245), para.1.4 
4 SLC, Report, [2016], para.3.3 
5 See SLC, Report, [2016], Appendix A. 
6 See SLC, Report, [2016], Chapter 3, passim. 
7 Scottish Legal Complaints Commission, Annual Report 2016 – 2017, p.15 
8 Since abolished by s.11 of the 2017 Act. 
9 See Scottish Law Commission, Review of Contract Law - Discussion Paper on Third Party Rights in Contract, 
[2014] SLC Discussion Paper No.157, para.2.29-2.32 
10 See the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol XI, paras 1073 and 1078 
11 See Stair, Institutions I, 10, 4; Bankton, Institute, I, 11, 6; Erskine, Institute, III, 1, 8 
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 The second issue concerned the irrevocable nature of jura quaesitum tertio in Scots 
law.12  Once created, an enforceable jus quaesitum tertio could not be destroyed or altered by 
the contracting parties.13 This was so in spite of the general principle of contract law that the 
terms of a contract can be varied at any time where the contracting parties consent to such 
change. This facet of jura quaesitum tertio, consequently, ostensibly stood at odds with the 
general principles of Scottish contract law.14 The third issue concerned the fact that, though the 
law pertaining to jus quaesitum tertio was seemingly concerned only with personal rights, this 
area of law had a tendency to become ‘clouded’ by its close functional links to matters of law 
which are concerned with real rights.15 ‘Title conditions’, prior to the introduction of the Title 
Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003,16 were routinely created by means of an express or implied 
jus quaestium tertio.17 Although seemingly categorised as rights in personam18 rather than in 
rem,19 ‘real conditions’ of this kind were thought to be ‘correctly classified as part of the law 
of property’,20 the subject matter of which is said to be ‘real rights’. As there is an ‘unbridgeable 
divide’ between real rights and personal rights in Scots law,21 the reason for these close links 
has hitherto been unclear.  
To facilitate discussion, this article is, itself, divided into three sections. The first of 
these provides a historic overview of the concept of jus quaesitum tertio before concluding by 
contextualising the problems posed above in this introduction. The second section discusses 
the etymology of the juridical term ‘ius’ and seeks to define it within the context of both Gaius 
and Justinian’s Institutes. In the third and final section, this paper provides a full discussion of 
the division of law into the categories of persons, things and actions and undertakes an analysis 
of the emergence of the law of obligations as a separate legal category. Ultimately, this paper 
concludes by submitting that it may be that the doctrine of jus quaesitum tertio stood as an 
example of an element of law caught in the gap left between the modern Scots law of property 
and the modern law of obligations, when the latter finally broke off from the law pertaining to 
things in the seventeenth century and became, itself, a distinct category of law.22   
A. JUS QUAESITUM TERTIO 
The notion that the parties to a bilateral agreement may create an enforceable benefit 
and confer such on a third party has a long history in Scots law; indeed, one of the earliest cases 
                                                          
12 See Carmichael v Carmichael’s Executrix1920 SC (HL) 195; East Dunbartonshire Council v Smith 
LTS/LO/1995/16 
13 SLC, Report, [2016], para.1.8 
14 Indeed, it was considered a ‘key concern’ with the common law: MacFarlane, Third Party Rights, (2013)  
15 SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.2.22; for a discussion of ‘real rights’ and an analysis of the alleged 
numerus clausus of ‘real rights’ present in Scots law, see Roderick R. M Paisley, Real Rights: Pragmatic Problems 
and Dogmatic Rigidity, [2005] Edin. L.R 267, pp.268-269 
16 See the discussion in Andrew Steven and Scott Wortley, Is That Burden Dead Yet?, JLSS (19/06/06) 
17 Kenneth Reid, The Title Conditions Bill, JLSS (01/11/00) 
18 Notwithstanding the fact that ‘the right of the third party is not contractual’: See William McBryde, The Law 
of Contract in Scotland, (3rd Edition) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2007), para.10.23 
19 Kenneth Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, (Edinburgh: LexisNexis, 1996) para.346 
20 Reid, Property, para.346 
21 Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger and Another [2004] UKHL 8; para.87 
22 The division of law into (classically) persons, things and actions and (contemporarily) persons, things, actions 
and obligations.  
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on the matter was decided by the Court of Session in 1591.23 Unlike in English law, wherein 
the principle of ‘privity of contract’ remained sovereign until legislative intervention expressly 
provided for the creation of third party rights,24 Scots law historically recognised that an 
individual may sue the parties to a contract, notwithstanding the fact that said individual was 
never party to that contract, if the individual in question explicitly or implicitly benefits from 
the grant of a jus quaesitum tertio.25 
The salient features of a jus quaesitum tertio are as follows: The primary contracting 
parties (termed the ‘stipulator’ and the ‘debtor’)26 contract so as to confer an enforceable benefit 
of some kind or another upon a third party, who is not otherwise party to the agreement.27 In 
so contracting, the stipulator and the debtor must intend to confer an enforceable right upon 
that third party.28 Although the word jus may be translated as ‘duty’ as well as ‘right’, the 
primary contracting parties cannot contract so as to impose an obligation or a duty on the third 
party without that third party’s consent;29 they may only confer a right (or other benefit).30 
Similarly the third party is not obliged to notify the contracting parties that he or she has 
accepted the conferring of the right in order to bring the jus quaesitum tertio into lawful 
existence.31  
In order for the third party right to be effective, the contract must ensure that the 
intended third party can be properly identified – either by specifically naming an individual 
person or by allowing the identification of the interested third party by reference to the 
membership of a class of specific persons.32 Further to this, the party may be identified as any 
person, if the contract provides that said person must first fulfil a set of specified criteria, as in 
Kelly v Cornhill Insurance Company Ltd,33 indicating that suspensive or resolutive conditions 
may be legitimately incorporated into contracts providing for third party rights. The jus 
quaesitum tertio does not come into existence on the fulfilment of such condition; it exists as 
a part of the contract before this time and simply becomes enforceable once the suspensive or 
resolutive condition is met.34 
The question of the irrevocability of jura quaesitum tertio proved controversial 
throughout the history of the concept in Scots law and this particular point has raised wider 
                                                          
23 Wood v Moncur 1591 Mor. 7719  
24 Via the introduction of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999; for a study on the emergence of the 
concept of privity, see Vernon V. Palmer, The Paths to Privity: The History of Third Party Beneficiary Contracts 
at English Law, (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 1992), passim 
25 James C.D. Sandeman, Green’s Encyclopaedia of the Law of Scotland, Vol.VII, (Edinburgh: W. Green and 
Son, 1898) pp.205-207 
26 Scottish Law Commission, Constitution and Proof of Voluntary Obligations: Stipulations in Favour of Third 
Parties, [1977] SLC Memorandum No.38 
27 See SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.2.3 
28 Denny’s Trs v Dumbarton Magistrates 1945 SC 147; McBryde, Contract, , para.10.12 
29 Howgate Shopping Centre Ltd v GLS 164 Ltd. 2002 SLT 820. 
30 SLC, Report, [2016], para.2.23 
31 Stair, Institutions, I, 10, 4-5 
32 As in Rose, Murison and Thomson v Wingate, Birrell & Co.’s Trustees (1889) 16 R 1132 and Thomson v 
Thomson 1962 SC (HL) 28 
33 1964 SC (HL) 46 
34 See Love v Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers of Great Britain and Ireland 1912 SC 1078 and the 
comment in SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.2.75 
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questions concerning the theoretical framework in which the doctrine operated. As noted 
above, a jus quaesitum tertio could become extant – and irrevocable – without the third party 
having expressly intimated acceptance of it.35 While the courts have consistently maintained 
that a simple term in favour of a third party is not sufficient to deprive the debtor and stipulator 
of their ordinary right to vary their contract as they so consent,36 per Carmichael v 
Carmichael’s Executrix, a jus quaesitum tertio could become irrevocable in a number of ways: 
by delivery or intimation of the contract to the third party, or otherwise putting the contract out 
of the power of the contracting parties; by registration of the contract; by dint of the third 
party’s knowledge of the contract term in its favour; or by dint of the third party’s reliance 
upon the contract term in its favour.37 
The Scottish Law Commission noted that while matters such as delivery or intimation 
of the contract to the third party, or the registration of the contract with the Books of Council 
and Session, might indicate as a matter of course that the contracting parties have “moved 
beyond the stage of thinking about the creation of a right for the third party to a concluded 
intention that such a right should exist”,38 the latter two reasons for irrevocability set forth by 
Lord Dunedin in Carmichael appear unrelated to the question of the intentions of the 
contracting parties.39 Rather, in the Commission’s view, these seem to be “driven more by 
considerations of fairness and justice to the third party when other objective manifestations of 
the contracting parties’ intention have not taken place”.40 Quite why a jus quaesitum tertio 
should be irrevocable consequently appears inconsistent with the general rules of Scots law.  
Conscious of this consideration, Dunedin held the view that irrevocability was the 
salient feature of any given jus quaesitum tertio, not merely a consequential aspect of a 
successfully concluded example.41 This view, however, attracted much academic criticism as 
‘a disingenuous gloss on Stair’;42 indeed, by the time of the Scottish Law Commission’s 2014 
discussion paper, the views of Dunedin and Stair were seen as so divergent that they were 
described as ‘opposing’ one another.43 
The now-prevailing view of Stair’s work maintains that he considered that the jus 
quaesitum tertio came into being as a unilateral promise, made by the contracting parties, to 
the non-contracting third party.44 On this view, the jus quaesitum tertio was only irrevocable 
once the third party became aware of their right, expressly intimated an acceptance of the right, 
or undertook reasonable actions on the assumption that they were entitled to the third party 
right. Since jura quaesitum tertio could only arise from the creation of a contract, however, 
many commentators felt that the analysis of the jus quaesitum tertio as a species of unilateral 
obligation was inadequate, and preferred to regard the doctrine as a separate matter, with its 
                                                          
35 Carmichael v Carmichael’s Executrix 1920 SC (HL) 195 
36 SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.2.58 
37 Carmichael v Carmichael’s Executrix 1920 SC (HL) 195 
38 SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.2.62 
39 SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.2.62 
40 SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.2.62 
41 Carmichael v Carmichael’s Executrix, p.199; see also SLC, Stipulations, [1977], p.9 
42 Muirhead, Roman Law, p.79 
43 SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.1.14 
44 Stair, Institutions, I, 10, 4-5 
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own sui generis character.45 The difficulty with the decision in Carmichael in respect of 
revocability therefore retains some significance, on this view, as even – indeed, especially – a 
sui generis approach to jus quaesitum tertio would similarly be required to remain consistent 
with the underlying rules of the Scots law of obligations. 
In spite of the noted controversy, the treatment of jus quaesitum tertio by Stair has long 
been regarded as seminal; indeed, so great is the influence of his seventeenth century work that 
some Scottish solicitors felt that, until the introduction of the 2017 Act, the law on this matter 
was ‘stuck in the 17th century’.46 The Scottish Law Commission certainly preferred Stair’s 
original conceptualisation of the jus quaesitum tertio as a species of unilateral promise to 
Dunedin’s view or any sui generis approach in their 1977 memorandum47 and it appears that, 
for all the later comment, in propounding what has since been regarded as his own school of 
thought, Dunedin simply believed that he was continuing in the vein that Stair intended.48 It is, 
however, apparent that, while Stair’s treatment of jus quaesitum tertio certainly was 
foundational in providing the first general statement of the Scots law pertaining to third party 
rights, his work was ultimately built on a solid jurisprudence of over a century past.49 The Lords 
of Session had consistently recognised the legitimacy of third party rights throughout the course 
of the seventeenth century50 and it is apparent that the existence of the concept was not regarded 
as a controversial element of Scots law, or the wider jus commune, at the end of the sixteenth 
century.51 The mediaeval canon lawyers had, by this time, done much to develop and entrench 
the idea of jus quaesitum tertio in the positive law;52 thus, though there was some element of 
what an English jurist might term ‘privity’ present in Continental European and Scots 
jurisprudence at this time53 – indeed, the notion was present before the equivalent emerged in 
English law54 – the jus commune conceptualisation of ‘privity’ appears dilute when compared 
directly to the evolution of its robust English cousin.55 
The term ‘privity’ itself has been described as ‘mysterious and undefined’,56 for good 
reason. As Vernon Palmer notes, “it is surely a generic term that has acquired diverse 
meanings and functions in different periods and contexts… [the term] conceals a lengthy 
evolution and a vast inventory of ideas, rules and principles”.57 The use and understanding of 
                                                          
45 SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], para.2.3 
46 Douglas Mathie, Third-party rights – Scots Law stuck in the 17 Century, August 2010, accessible at: 
https://brodiestechblog.wordpress.com/2010/08/26/third-party-rights-%E2%80%93-scots-law-stuck-in-the-
17thcentury/ 
47 SLC, Stipulations, [1977], p.5 
48 Carmichael v Carmichael’s Executrix, p.200 
49 Hector MacQueen, Third Party Rights in Contract: Jus Quaesitum Tertio, in Kenneth Reid and Reinhard 
Zimmerman (Eds.) A History of Private Law in Scotland, Vol. II (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp.221-222 
50 Auchmoutie v Hay (1609) Mor. 12126; Supplicants v Nimmo (1627) Mor. 7740; Kenton v Ayton (1634) Mor. 
7721; See also Sir Thomas Hope’s Major Prackticks, (1608-33) II, 1, 30 (1616); II, 3, 37 (1612) 
51 MacQueen, Jus Quaesitum Tertio, p.223 
52 J.T Cameron, Jus Quaesitum Tertio: The True Meaning of Stair I.x.5, [1961] Jur. Rev. 107 
53 Palmer, Privity, (1992), p.1 
54 Palmer, Privity, (1992), p.1 
55 Palmer, Privity, (1992), pp.1-2 
56 Arthur I. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, Vol. IV (West Publishing: 1952), para.778  
57 Palmer, Privity, (1992), p.6 
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the term varies widely even between Common law jurisdictions.58 It is, however, apparent that 
– even if only as a consequence of the term’s versatility, the word ‘privity’ may be interpreted 
as a wide blanket-term which encapsulates three key principles of Roman law: Alteri stipulari 
nemo potest (no-one is able to contract for another),59 per extraneam personam nihil adquiri 
posse (nothing is able to be acquired through [the actions of] an extraneous person)60 and ex 
nudo pacto non oritur actio (no action arises from bare agreement).61  
Thus, in spite of the Latin nomenclature of the term jus quaesitum tertio, and the 
concept’s significant role in jus commune jurisprudence, jura quaesitum tertio were not 
recognised in Roman law and the contemporary Scottish doctrine of jus quaesitum tertio is not 
Roman in origin.62 Indeed, the concept of third party rights was ostensibly anathema to three 
principles of Roman law mentioned above and as such, as MacQueen wryly notes, with the 
affirmation of Viscount Haldane that English law ‘knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio 
arising by way of contract’ in 1915,63 the supposedly ‘home-grown’ English Common law 
became, in this respect, the most Roman of all modern jurisdictions in Europe.64   
Since the theoretical underpinning of the Scottish concept of jus quaesitum tertio was 
not Roman in origin, and the pre-Stair Scottish authorities did not seem to concern themselves 
with the theoretical framework in which the concept operated,65 it is small wonder that Stair’s 
view proved so influential; in conceptualising the jus quaesitum tertio as a species of unilateral 
obligation, Stair provided not only the first general statement of, but also the first justification 
for the existence of, third party rights in Scotland.  
The conceptualisation of jus quaesitum tertio as a species of obligation, has, however, 
proven theoretically problematic. The modern Scots understanding of obligations as providing 
persons with a kind of ‘personal right’ necessitates an extant beneficiary of such rights;66 yet, 
as a long list of authorities makes apparent, no beneficiary needed to exist at the time of the 
creation of a jus quaesitum tertio.67 Additionally, the close proximity in which jura quaesitum 
tertio operated in respect of real rights was considered problematic, given the ‘unbridgeable 
divide’68 between real and personal rights in Scots law.69 The interrogation of the concept of 
jus quaesitum tertio as a species of promise may suffice in almost all situations, but it does not 
answer why two seemingly incompatible types of right come (apparently) illogically close to 
one another so often in this particular area of law. 
                                                          
58 Palmer, Privity, (1992), pp.8-10 
59 See Dig.45.1.38.17; see also Gaius, Institutiones, II, p.95 
60 See Justinian, Institutiones, II, IX 
61 See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as 
the Science of Right, Vol.I (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 1887), Editor’s Preface, p.40 
62 See Reinhard Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, (1990), p.34 
63 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v Selfridge [1915] AC 847 
64 MacQueen, Jus Quaesitum Tertio, p.221 
65 MacQueen, Jus Quaesitum Tertio, p.223 
66 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol XI, paras 1073 and 1078 
67 Stair, Institutions I, 10, 4; Bankton, Institute, I, 11, 6; Erskine, Institute, III, 1, 8; Morton’s Trustees v Aged 
Christian Friend Society of Scotland (1899) 2 F 82; SLC, Discussion Paper, [2014], paras.2.29-2.32 
68 In the words of Lord Rodger: Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger and Another [2004] UKHL 8; para.87 
69 See Professor Kenneth Reid’s commentary in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol. XVIII, para.402 
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The solution to these issues – a solution, which remains consistent with the view that 
the irrevocable nature of jura quaesitum tertio arises as a consequence, rather than as a 
constitutive element of, the creation of such jura – lies in the conceptualisation of all iura in 
Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civile. Commonly translated as ‘right’ in both the objective sense (as 
something that is correct, or ‘right’) and the subjective sense (as a ‘right’ enjoyed by a person), 
the etymology of the word ‘ius’ is particularly complex;70 indeed, the scholarship of numerous 
authors (foremost amongst them the French scholar Michel Villey) indicates that the Romans 
themselves had no concept of subjective ‘rights’71 and so to equate the Latin ‘ius’ with the 
English term ‘a right’ is to err. One must consequently consider alternative understandings at 
all times when dealing with such a complex term.72 In the Corpus Iuris Civile itself, 
obligationes are classified as but one example of res incorporales created iure – by law, or by 
dint of the law’s authority.73 Accordingly, the ‘rights’ arising from obligations were governed 
under the broader legal category of the ius quod ad res pertinet – the law pertaining to things.74 
On a wholly Romanistic view, therefore, a jus quaesitum tertio may be conceptualised 
not as a right, but as a res incorporalis which is created by the force of the private law when 
the stipulator and debtor contract. This interpretation, it is submitted, explains simply why a 
jus quaesitum tertio may be legitimately created with a view to benefitting an entity which does 
not, yet, juristically exist; the incorporeal thing is created and exists as an intangible object 
which the beneficiary of the jus quaesitum tertio may claim once they achieve a juristic 
existence; since the jus quaesitum tertio is not a right, it does not matter that there is no extant 
beneficiary at the time of its creation. Similarly, this view explains why the jus quaesitum tertio 
is irrevocable once it has been created: if the jus quaesitum tertio exists as a res incorporalis, 
once the jus quaesitum tertio is conferred on the third party by the debtor and the stipulator, 
the debtor and the stipulator no longer hold any legal interest in the thing, although they 
themselves created it. The interests of the third party are protected by the principles of the ius 
quod ad res pertinet since they enjoy a jus quaesitum tertio in their favour: The third party, in 
a sense, holds a ‘real right’ in or to the ‘personal right’ that is the obligatio.75 
As might be inferred from the final sentence of the preceding paragraph, this 
conceptualisation also addresses why jura quaesitum tertio consistently mixed juristic oil and 
water – real rights and personal rights. Although these concepts are seemingly dissonant,76 it 
is apparent that in Roman law the concepts, as understood today, did not exist and so cannot 
                                                          
70 As Tuck notes, Latin has now enjoyed a literary history of some nineteen hundred years and so has existed for 
a greater length of time as a written language than English has existed as a spoken language: Richard Tuck, 
Natural Rights Theories: Their Origins and Development, (Cambridge: CUP, 1979), p.7 
71 See Michel Villey, L’idee du Droit Subjectif et les Systemés Juridiques Romains, [1946] Revue Historique De 
Droit 201-228; Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p.100; Tuck, 
Natural Rights Theories, (1979), p.7; Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, (Cambridge: Eerdman’s, 1997), 
p.1; Ernest Metzger, Actions, in Ernest Metzger (Ed.), A Companion to Justinian’s Institutes, (London: 
Duckworth, 1998) pp.208-209 
72 The word ius may be taken to have such varied meanings as ‘an oath’, ‘a duty’, ‘the law’, ‘a law court’, ‘legal 
authority’, ‘justly’, ‘correct’ and ‘soup’; all of these possible alternatives (save, perhaps, the last of the given 
examples), among others, must be considered by the translator whenever they are faced with this mercurial term. 
73 Justinian, Institutes, Book II, para.1-2 
74 Justinian, Institutes, Book II, Title II 
75 Hence – though the point is not moot – it might be inferred, even in the absence of authority, that the third party 
may revoke or renounce the right at their leisure: See McBryde, Contract, para.10-32 
76 See The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia Vol. 18, para.402 
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be regarded as fundamentally distinct from one another. In the absence of a developed doctrine 
of subjective rights, Roman law cannot be said to have spoken of ‘rights’ arising under contract, 
or of ‘ownership’, or of ‘property’ at all: As Villey discusses, dominium did not refer to a ‘right’ 
in Roman law77 and so, since ‘property’ was not a right, the word ius simply cannot have meant 
‘right’.78 The fact that real rights and personal rights are commonly Latinised as ‘ius in re’ and 
‘ius in personam’ is misleading; to paraphrase Professor MacCormick it is not only bad 
grammar and bad Latin to refer to rights in rem, but the ‘inconclusive character’ of the English-
language literature on this topic provides further justification for avoiding the use of the word 
‘rights’ in relation to Roman res altogether.79  
It is clear that this melding of the language of ‘real’ and ‘personal’ rights appears 
repugnant to contemporary Civilian doctrine and so this theory of jus quaesitum tertio is 
undoubtedly controversial. A simple objection may be raised in relation to it by reference to 
the fact that, just as the Romans had no conception of ‘rights’, neither did their legal system 
recognise the existence or possibility of contracts creating a jus quaesitum tertio. To this 
objection it may be countered that, although the notion that one could create a jus quaesitum 
tertio was itself alien to Roman law, the wider principles of Roman law as set out in the Corpus 
Iuris Civile nevertheless govern the operation of the doctrine in modern Scots law, since 
Scotland (along with South Africa)80 remains an uncodified example of a 'living’ Roman legal 
system.81 Accordingly, in building any theory of jus quaesitum tertio, it is legitimate – indeed, 
it is submitted, necessary – to first consider the governance of iura and obligationes in the 
operation of Roman law. 
Other objections may be legitimately raised which criticise the conceptualisation of a 
jus quaesitum tertio as a species of res; it is hoped that the following sections of this paper, 
which discuss the nature of the Roman ius quod ad res pertinet and its connection to the modern 
Scottish division of law, will address some of these concerns.  
B. De Rerum Divisione 
 The Roman rerum divisione is elegant in its simplicity. According to Professor Gretton, 
this ‘Gaian schema’ continues to form the foundational framework of almost all modern 
systems of property law, including those in Common law jurisdictions.82 The basic division of 
things into tangible and intangible objects set out under the heading De Rebus Incorporalibus 
is identical in the work of both Gaius and Justinian:  
                                                          
77 Villey, L’idee du Droit Subjectif, [1946], pp.201-228; Du Sens de l’expression Jus in Re en Droit Romain 
Classique, [1949], pp.417-436; Le ‘Jus In Re’ du Droit Romain Classique au Droit Moderene, [1950], pp.187-
225; ‘Suum Jus Cuique Tribuens’, (1956) pp.361-371; Les Origines de la Notion du Droit Subjectif, (1952) 
pp.221-250; La Genése du Droit Subjectif Chez Guillaume d’Occam, [1964], pp.99-127; La Formation de la 
Pensée Juridique Moderne, (1968), passim.  
78 See Villey, ibid. See also Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, (1979), p.8 
79 Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory, (Oxford University Press, 2007) para.8.1 
80 Which, like classical and Justinianic Roman law, contemporaneously lacks any concept of jus quaesitum tertio, 
having instead developed a separate, yet apparently analogous, strand of jurisprudence concerning the concept of 
stipulatio alteri: See Philip Sutherland, Third-Party Contracts in Hector MacQueen and Reinhard Zimmermann 
(eds.), European Contract Law; Scots and South African Perspectives (Edinburgh: EUP, 2006), p.208 
81 Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2013), p.2 
82 George Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007] Rabels Zeitschrift 802, passim 
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Quaedam praeterea res corporales sunt, quaedam incorporales. Corporales eae sunt, quae 
sui natura tangi possunt: veluti fundus homo vestis aurum argentum et denique aliae res 
innumerabiles. Incorporales autem sunt, quae tangi non possunt. Qualia sunt ea, quae in iure 
consistunt: Sicut hereditas, usus fructus, obligationes quoquo modo contractae.83 
 Translated, the passage reads: 
‘There exist some things which are corporeal and others which are incorporeal. Corporeal 
things are those which are tangible by nature, such as farmland, human beings, clothes, gold, 
silver, and other innumerable things. Moreover, there are incorporeal [things], which are not 
capable of being touched. Such things exist only in law [or ‘by the law’s authority’]: such as 
inheritance, usufruct and obligations, however these are acquired.’84 
There have been several problematic translations of this short paragraph,85 many of 
which have served to confound a proper analysis of the rationale behind the division of things. 
Commonly, the issue stems from translators interpreting the listed res incorporales as 
‘rights’,86 as this is generally how modern jurists would conceptualise things such as 
inheritance and ususfruct today.87 Since dominium – what would today be understood as the 
‘right of ownership’ – is absent from the presented list of res incorporales, the Gaian schema 
has been criticised as ‘incoherent’: As ownership is, in the modern Civil law, understood as the 
‘sovereign, or primary real right’,88 the apparent absence of this concept from the enumerated 
list of res incorporales has consistently puzzled scholars.89 
To understand the Roman juristic conceptualisation of incorporeal things as akin to 
rights is, however, plainly wrong. As indicated above, it is apparent that the Romans had no 
concept of subjective ‘rights’90 and that they managed to craft their complex and enduring legal 
system without any need for recourse to them.91 Accordingly, the absence of dominium from 
the enumerated list of exemplary res incorporales is hardly problematic; not only was 
                                                          
83 Justinian Institutes, Book II, Title II; Gaius, Institutes, Book II, para.12 
84 Author’s translation. 
85 Indeed, Moyle’s own translation is deficient, as indicated below. 
86 See, in particular, the translations of Justinian’s Institutes by Moyle and (separately) Scott - J.B Moyle 
Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutiones, (3rd Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), p.217; Samuel P. Scott, The 
Institutes of Justinian, (Cincinnati, 1932) Book II, para.12  
87 It is natural, when using the English language, to speak of a ‘right of inheritance’, or a ‘right of usufruct’, for 
example. 
88 John Erskine of Carnock, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, (8th Edition) (J.B Nicholson, 1871) II.i.1; Erskine’s 
definition would fit perfectly at home in French law (see Françoise Moulin and Edwige Laforêt, Introduction au 
Droit, (Dunod, 2009), p.253), South African law (see J.R.L Milton, Ownership, in Reinhard Zimmerman and 
Daniel Visser, Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
p.699) and other Civilian and Civilian-influenced legal systems: See Jane Ball, The Boundaries of Property Rights 
in English Law, Report to the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, July 2006 [2006] EJCL: 
http://www.ejcl.org/103/art103-1.pdf 
89 See Francesco Giglio, Pandectism and the Gaian Classification of Things, [2012] University of Toronto Law 
Journal 1 and the discussion in Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007], passim. 
90 Michel Villey, L’idee du Droit Subjectif, [1946], pp.201-228; Nicholas, Roman Law, p.100; Tuck, Natural 
Rights Theories, (1979), p.7; Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, (1997), p.1; Metzger, Actions, pp.208-209 
91 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, (1997), p.1 
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dominium not considered a ‘right’ or ‘ius’ in Roman law,92 it was also not considered a res by 
the jurists since a res was an entity of some kind over which one enjoyed dominium.  
The difficulty of what, precisely, dominium was considered to be by Roman law has 
attracted a great deal of academic commentary93 and, just as many lawyers schooled in the 
Common law tradition find it difficult to define what is meant by the word ‘property’ 
juridically,94 the word dominium has managed to evade precise definition in Civilian95 
jurisprudence.96 Over time, some competing theories – notably the ‘merger’ interpretation and 
the ‘titularity’ approach97 – have, however, gained mainstream prominence, if not acceptance 
in academic circles.  
The ‘merger interpretation’, which was favoured by the German Pandectists,98 
maintains that res incorporales are themselves rights – either ‘real’ or ‘personal’ – but that they 
are also, at the same time, things which may be the object of a right of ownership; the ‘right of 
ownership’ being, on this view, a right unlike any other.99 On this view, although the ‘right of 
ownership’ itself is an incorporeal thing in ordinary parlance and a ‘right’ in law, it is ultimately 
incomparable to other rights and incorporeal things given that it confers sovereignty over a res 
on the one who holds it. When one claims dominium meum est, one essentially claims no more 
than meum esse. When one asserts res meum est there is an underlying implication that one has 
a ‘right’ to the thing, in modern parlance. The merger interpretation, therefore, fits well with 
Professor Reid’s assertion that ‘property law is the law of things and of rights in things’.100 It 
also reconciles the classical Roman law with the developments which occurred in the Civilian 
tradition which grew out of it. If one accepts the merger interpretation, then according to both 
the classical Roman law and the Civilian law, dominium confers on the dominus a real right to 
the res which grants the dominus ius disponendi over it.101 In addition, though possession is 
                                                          
92 Michel Villey, Du Sens de l’expression Jus in Re en Droit Romain Classique, [1949], pp.417-436; Le ‘Jus In 
Re’ du Droit Romain Classique au Droit Moderene, [1950], pp.187-225; Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, (1979), 
p.8 
93 See the discussion in Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007], passim 
94 See George W. Paton and David P. Derham, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, (4th Ed.) (Oxford University Press, 
1972) p.505; Margaret Davis, Property: Meanings, History, Theories, (Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) p.3 
95 It is noted that, though Scotland is an example of a ‘mixed’ legal system, the authors of the 2009 National 
Report on the Transfer of Moveables described the modern property law of Scotland as ‘resolutely Civilian’ – see 
David Carey-Miller, Malcolm Combe, Andrew Steven and Scott Wortley, National Report on the Transfer of 
Movables in Scotland, in Wolfgang Faber and Brigitta Lurger (Eds.), National Reports on the Transfer of 
Movables in Europe Volume 2: England and Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Cyprus, (Sellier, 2009) p.311 
96 Indeed, the term dominium was never defined in the Roman sources, perhaps indicating heed of Priscus’ well-
founded statement ‘each definition in the Civil law is dangerous, for those that cannot be subverted are rare’; see 
Dig.50.17.202 
97 Discussed in Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007], passim 
98 Giglio, Pandectism and the Gaian Classification of Things, [2012], p.5 
99 Peter Birks, The Roman Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership, [1985] Acta Juridica 1, 
pp.26 
100 Reid, Property, para.11 
101 Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In Primam Digesti Novi Partem Commentaria ad Dig. 41.2.17.1 No.4, (1574; 
Electronic Edition by A.J.B Sirks, 2004); David L. Carey Miller and David Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots 
Law, (W. Green, 2005) para.8.01 
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ultimately unrelated to dominium,102 domini are generally granted a right to possess their res.103 
On this view of the Gaian schema, to legitimately call a thing ‘mine’ is to have ownership of 
the thing104 and to have ownership of a thing is to have the right to use, destroy, or to profit 
from that thing, in addition to the right of alienation105 or sale (commercio).106 
 In spite of the popularity of the merger interpretation, and its consistency with the 
understanding of ‘property’ in Anglo-American law107 as well as contemporary Civilian 
jurisprudence, it has not been immune to criticism108 and it is ultimately evident that it is fatally 
flawed due to its overly rights-centric nature. By conceding that the res incorporales are 
‘rights’, and conceptualising dominium itself as a ‘right’, the merger interpretation clearly fails 
to describe adequately the Gaian Rerum Divisione in terms consistent with the absence of a 
language of rights. Additionally, taken to its logical extreme, the division between dominium 
and possessio – two concepts which ‘have nothing in common with one another according to 
Roman law109 – would break down if the merger interpretation was an accurate reflection of 
Roman dominium, since, if ‘ownership’ is to be fully identified with the object that is owned, 
as the merger interpretation necessitates, then one cannot, in law, say ‘I have the thing!’ and 
mean no more than that they have simple factual sovereignty over – or possessio of – a thing, 
since having a thing, on this view, necessarily implies ownership.110 
The titularity interpretation, pioneered by Professor Ginossar,111 provides a more 
appropriately Roman understanding of dominium. According to this view, ‘ownership’, is 
conceptualised as the relationship between a person and a thing by which that thing belongs to 
the person.112 According to Ginossar’s view, the relationship (dominium) between the person 
and the thing confers ‘title’ to the thing upon the person; this ‘title’ is recognised by the law 
and grants an innumerable number of things which might be termed ‘rights’ to the title-holder, 
but is not itself a ‘right’ as it has no correlative obligation.113 This interpretation explains why 
dominium is omitted from the res incorporales by Gaius and Justinian; they saw no need to 
define the ‘right of ownership’ as there is no such right.114 A ‘right of ownership’, though 
ostensibly an incorporeal thing, cannot be ‘owned’ as it is not a res; the phrase describes the 
                                                          
102 Dig. 41.2.12.1; Eric Descheemaeker, The Consequences of Possession, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2014), p.1 
103 Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Vol.12 (W. Green, 1930) p.205, para.436 
104 Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007], p.807 
105 Anstruther v Anstruther (1836) 14 S.272 
106 Paul Du Plessis, Borkowski's Textbook on Roman Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2015) p.160 
107 See, for example, the definition of ‘property’ proferred in the American Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence: Am. 
Jur. 2d, Property, § 1 
108 See Henri de Page, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil Belge V, (1941) 5, 536; Nicholas, Roman Law, p.107; 
Paton and Derham, Jurisprudence, (1972) p.509; George Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, (2007) Rabels 
Zeitschrift Vol 71, passim; Giglio, Pandectism and the Gaian Classification of Things, [2012], p.7 
109 Dig. 41.2.12.1 
110 Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007], p.807; F.H Lawson, A Common Lawyers Looks at the Civil Law, 
(Michigan: Ann Arbour, 1955), p.112 
111 See S. Ginossar, Droit Réel, Propriété et Créance: Élaboration d'un Système Rationnel des Droits 
Patrimoniaux, (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1960), passim 
112 Ginossar, Droit Réel, Propriété et Créance, (1960), pp.46-47 
113 Giglio, Pandectism and the Gaian Classification of Things, [2012], pp.11-12 
114 Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007], p.806  
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relationship which one has with a res. A ‘right of ususfruct’, conversely, can be owned as it is 
simply a res. According to this interpretation, dominium may be exercised over res 
incorporales as they, like res corporales, are capable of forming part of one’s patrimony.115 
Dominium itself does not form a part of the patrimony; only the thing over which title is enjoyed 
does so. 
‘Patrimony’ has been defined as the institution by which the ownership of goods gains 
significance and by which proprietary rights may be exercised in Civilian legal systems.116 As 
a result of the doctrine of pater familias, however, res were not held in patrimony by individuals 
in Roman law, but rather they were owned by the whole familia.117 Anything that was ‘owned’ 
by the familia was legally administered and maintained by the pater as the representative of 
the familial unit.118 Individuals were not responsible for their own accounts; the pater was 
answerable in respect of the assets and liabilities of the familia.119 A pater was, essentially, ‘a 
debtor and creditor as regards other citizens’.120  
According to the titularity interpretation, the pater is to be regarded as the individual in 
whom title is vested in Roman law; in modern law, since each individual legal person enjoys 
control of their own patrimony, every legal person who owns a (corporeal or incorporeal) thing 
is viewed as enjoying title to that thing in law. Thus, it is apparent that the titularity 
interpretation is consistent with the use of the English word ‘property’ as a word with two 
distinct meanings in Roman law and Civilian milieu. It recognises that, firstly, the word may 
refer to dominium, or the state of having ownership of a particular res, or ‘thing’ and that the 
word might secondly be used to refer to the res, or ‘thing’, which is held in a person’s 
patrimony.121  
With that said, it may appear philosophically absurd, prima facie, to state that a person 
might enjoy a ‘relationship’ with a thing, and so the titularity interpretation may be doubted on 
this ground. To make such a claim is, however, problematic in itself; as is made clear by the 
Gaian Rerum Divisione, human beings are themselves categorised as corporeal things in 
Roman law.122 The word ‘homo’ is used by both Gaius and Justinian, indicating that it was not 
                                                          
115 Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007], p.806  
116 Christopher Berry Gray, The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia, (Routledge, 2013) p.266 
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simply the bodies of slaves which were subject to the ius quod ad res pertinet,123 but rather the 
corporeal existence of all human bodies.124 Accordingly, in any system which regards all 
human beings, legally, as ‘things’, it cannot be regarded as absurd to say that a person has a 
relationship with a thing – to state such is simply to say that a certain thing, albeit a thing with 
special status (an entity designated persona) is regarded as having a relationship with another 
thing in law.       
The distinction between human beings who are regarded as mere ‘things’ and nothing 
more and those who were afforded the superior status of personhood was determined by the 
wider private law, which was itself divided under three distinct headings: ‘all the law which 
we make use of has reference either to persons or to things or to actions’.125 According to this 
division of law, personae were simply those human beings whose lives fell to be governed by 
the ius quod ad personas pertinet, while slaves were those whose lives were governed by the 
rules of the ius quod ad res pertinet. It is notable, here, that Roman law had no separate category 
dealing with the ius quod ad obligationes pertinet; these rules of law fell, along with many 
other aspects of private law, under the broad heading of the ius quod ad res pertinet.  
On the basis of the above, however, it is submitted that, as the titularity interpretation 
can be considered consistent with both classical and post-Justinianic Roman law, as well as 
contemporary Scots law, dominium is best understood according to this approach. It is now 
consequently appropriate to consider the Romanistic understanding of the words ius and 
obligationes. Although the latter could be contemporaneously translated as ‘obligations’, and 
thus might be thought analogous in substance and in form to the modern interpretation of that 
term, the word obligatio did not, in fact, solely denote an obligation under which one was 
placed ex voluntate or ex lege. Rather, it usually meant ‘to be in the position where one 
benefitted from an agreement which laid an obligation (in our sense [of the term]) on the other 
party’.126 Thus, to have an obligatio in Roman law was to have an asset (or a liability) in one’s 
patrimony; the value of the benefit (or the cost of the liability) would be added to (or subtracted 
from) the sum total of the value of the patrimony of the familia. 
By the time of the later Roman Empire, the Emperor came to be regarded as the ultimate 
pater – pater patriae127 – with whom all Roman citizens could be said to have a bilateral 
relationship.128 The title of pater patriae was originally a legally insignificant honorific,129 
however the Emperor Augustus appears to have regarded the receipt of the title pater patriae 
as the pinnacle of his political career.130 He and his successors styled themselves as patres of 
the Empire, with each citizen forming a part of their familia.131 Over time, the concept of Rome 
                                                          
123 In spite of what Poste’s translation of Gaius and Scott’s translation of Justinian appear to suggest: See E.A 
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as a familia with her leaders as patres appeared to develop and be retroactively applied: Livy 
lauded Romulus as regem parentemque urbis132 and celebrated Camillus as conditorque alter 
urbis and parens patriae.133 The influence that these political developments exerted on the 
development of Roman law cannot be overstated. Indeed, it appears that, as a result of these 
developments, the legal concept of peculium appeared to be thereafter, and retroactively, 
applied to the Roman lawyer’s plain analysis of the concept of ‘property’.  
In Roman law, the word peculium was used to denote some part of the patrimony of a 
paterfamilias over which the pater ceded limited authority or control to a member of the familia 
over whom the pater enjoyed either potesta or dominium.134 By this legal mechanism, those 
who were not sui iuris could be said to ‘own’ property in practice,135 although the true benefits 
of the proprietary relationship remained with the pater.136 The confusion of the concept of 
dominium as an example of a ius appears to have developed as the idea of dominium as the 
complete and total mastery over a tangible or juristic res which one held in one’s estate became 
increasingly remote, as the Emperor claimed to hold the power and authority to intervene in 
almost all aspects of the lives of the citizenry.137 Accordingly, it appeared to the average 
observer that dominium was simply another kind of ius, since the authority which one held over 
one’s patrimony was granted by dint of agreement with the Emperor.138   
The claim that ‘property’ may be understood as peculium granted to, and forming a part 
of the estate of, patres by the State finds some support in Roman literature, wherein Plautus 
appears to use peculium to mean ‘property’ in its widest sense;139 Cicero, too, equated peculium 
with ‘property’ when decrying the populace as materialistic:140  cupiditate peculii.141 Pliny the 
Younger is most explicit about the connection:142 He expresses the view that slaves were to 
view their owner’s familia as their own State or city,143 an idea which appears to have roots in 
the writings of Seneca.144 Just as a pater familias could cede control of a part of the patrimony 
of the familia to an individual in that familia in the form of a peculium, so too could the pater 
patriae cede control of a part of the patrimony of the Empire to a citizen of the Empire. 
Consequently, just as a slave could only control property within the household and subject to 
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the authority of the pater, so too can it be said that Roman citizens only legally control property 
within the confines of the State, subject to the authority of the pater patriae. 
Accordingly, it is apparent from the above that the concept of dominium was never a 
ius in Roman law, although it did take on the appearance as such in the later Empire. Initially, 
it appears that the term ius/jus was used to represent the favourable judgement of a lawsuit – 
i.e., the winner of the legal case was ius, or ‘right’.145 From this, the word took on its nature as 
synonymic with ‘law’; thus Paulus was able to distinguish the law of nature from the law of 
the State by describing that which is always fair or good as ius naturale and that which is of 
best for all or most in civil society as ius civile146 and, ‘at a lower level’,147 particular rules of 
law could be described as ius since they denoted what was ‘right’ in particular circumstances.148  
The early use of the term also indicates that, although the term did not extend to cover 
criminal matters,149 it was ‘generally taken to be the right [correct] way in which two disputants 
should behave towards each other’.150 Over time, the word evolved to take on other meanings, 
however, these ‘newer’ uses remained tied to the existence and operation of interpersonal 
relationships.151 In addition to denoting a particular rule of law and the manner in which 
disputants were to correctly interact with one another, a ius was also a species of res 
incorporalis which could be created by way of a legally binding agreement between private 
personae.152 Such agreements did not necessarily create constructs which would be considered 
‘rights’; an obligatio could create a liability, or an immunity, or a duty. Tuck takes the iura 
praediorum listed by Gaius153 as exemplary of this kind of use, noting that no individual had 
the ‘right’ to tolerate their neighbour’s overflowing gutter, rather, they were duty-bound to do 
so.154  
It is notable that the iura praediorum are ‘also called servitudes’.155 As a legal 
construct, servitudes would generally be regarded as a kind of ‘real’ right in modern Scots and 
Civil jurisprudence,156 since no particular person is bound in personam by the servitude.157 This 
modern distinction between ‘real’ and ‘personal’ rights has no bearing on the creation of any 
kind of ius by dint of agreement in Roman law, however; to make brief, forgivable, use of ‘bad 
grammar and bad Latin’,158 both iura in rebus and iura in personas were species of obligatio. 
The iura praediorum gained a juristic existence as the result of agreement between neighbours. 
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In the absence of such agreement, they would not exist. Thus, it is plain to see that these iura 
could be considered obligationes created iure – which would evidently mean that they would 
also be conceptualised as res incorporales in law159 – notwithstanding the fact that servitudes 
best fit within the modern category of ‘real’ rights. 
The notion of dominium, as ‘mastery of one’s estate’ pre-dated the ascendancy of the 
pater patriae as a legally significant figure and so it seems that, in spite of appearances, 
dominium did not arise as a result of a bilateral agreement. As it cannot be considered an 
obligatio, it consequently falls outwith the scope of iura and cannot be called either a ius or a 
res incorporalis, explaining why, precisely, it is nonsense to talk of the concept of ownership 
itself as a ‘thing’ in both Roman and modern law.160  It is apparent that the confusion of the 
concept of dominium with the concept of ius stemmed from the relationship which existed 
between the citizens of the Empire and the Emperor himself. Iura were created by bilateral 
relationships and, as all citizens were conceptualised as having a bilateral relationship with the 
Emperor, and as the concept of peculium was already familiar to Roman law, it was facile for 
lawyers and laypersons to consider dominium as a kind of ius against the Emperor, as a 
peculium was a kind of ius against one’s pater. Though this analysis may have appeared natural 
to those who first carried it out, however, it served only to confound the efforts of future 
scholars to uncover what, precisely, the relationship between dominium and ius was.161 With 
the above discussion in mind, however, it is possible to properly define the terms dominium, 
ius and obligatio within the context of Roman law. 
Dominium, therefore, denoted the relationship which existed between a person and a 
thing. The nature of this relationship provided the dominus with naturally unlimited power and 
control over the thing in question. Such naturally unlimited freedom is, however, inimical to 
the operation of ordered civil society; consequently, dominium is ordinarily limited iure (by 
law). Such limits were governed by the bilateral relationship between citizen and Emperor, but 
this relationship presupposed dominium; it did not create the initial relationship between 
persona et res.  
Obligationes were not ‘obligations’ in the modern sense of the term; rather, they were 
incorporeal things – res incorporales – which formed a part of the patrimony of a persona. It 
is true to say that obligationes were iura in Roman law, but it is erroneous to so translate the 
word ius as ‘legal right’ in our modern sense of that concept. Ius must be understood as having 
a broader meaning than ‘legal right’ and one must appreciate that, on occasions on which the 
term may appear analogous to the modern understanding of subjective rights, there is no 
differentiation made between ‘real’ or ‘personal’ subjective rights. In summary, to quote Dr 
Tuck, ‘dominium and ius were both used, under the later Empire, in ways very similar to which 
we use the term ‘right’, but the explanation for this is to be found in a very different kind of 
theory from any which we use the word ‘right’ to expound’.162   
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If this view is taken to its extreme, then, philosophically, the language of ‘rights’ is 
nugatory; 163 juridically, the language of rights serves only to cloak the operation of altogether 
different concepts such as relationships, duties and obligations. To say that one has a legal right 
may be a useful shorthand for indicating that one has a legal entitlement as a result of one’s 
relationship with another, or as a result of another’s duty, but it can serve no other, grander 
purpose; indeed, to use this language can obscure that which requires to be clarified. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that, on an analysis of Scots common law through the lens 
of Ginossar’s titularity interpretation of the Gaian schema, just as a ‘right of tenancy’ can be 
regarded as a ‘thing’ that is held in dominium by a persona, so too can it be said that one may 
‘own’ a jus quaesitum tertio, notwithstanding the fact that a modern Scots scholar could 
differentiate a right of tenancy from a jus quaesitum tertio by reference to the fact that the 
former represents a ‘real right’ and the latter a ‘personal right’. It is plain that the concept of a 
jus quaesitum tertio fits within the parameters of res incorporales as described by both Gaius 
and Justinian. A valid jus quaesitum tertio was an intangible construct which existed in law, or 
by dint of the law’s authority. They were necessarily ‘good’ – to play on the dual meaning of 
that term164 – as to enjoy the benefit of a jus quaesitum tertio is to hold in one’s patrimony an 
asset. In addition, the concept falls within the Roman legal definition of the term obligatio, as 
this term did not simply mean ‘obligation’ in the sense of a task that one is obliged to perform; 
the word also extended to cover, among other things, the income arising from a concluded 
contract, or any such asset arising from an obligation of any kind.165  
Furthermore, it is clear that this Romanistic analysis of jus quaesitum tertio also serves 
to explain why, prior to the 2017 Act, concepts which are not ‘rights’ could be conferred upon 
third parties in contract and termed jus quaesitum tertio in law: All of the possible iura which 
may be conferred on a third party by a jus quaesitum tertio are juristic obligationes, therefore 
they are all res incorporales, even if they are not ‘rights’. It may be stretching the English word 
‘right’ to describe the provision of immunity from liability as a ‘right’, but it is certainly not 
stretching the Latin word ius to include this conception under that umbrella term. Hence, 
though Scots law was in the process of creating ‘its own rules for third-party remedies’ prior 
to the abolition of jus quaesitum tertio,166 it is thought that property law may have offered 
guidance as to the enforcement of the third party’s ‘right’.  
In a similar vein, the seemingly confused common commixture of ‘real’ and ‘personal’ 
rights in this area of law is explained. Since both real and personal ‘rights’ were simply species 
of iura arising from the provision of private agreement in Roman law, and since all obligationes 
were res incorporales, it may be concluded that jura quaesitum tertio in Scotland, though 
ostensibly governed under the heading of the law of obligations, actually fell into the gap of 
nondescript ‘thing law’ left between the law of obligations and the law of property when the 
former developed into a distinct legal category. The following question then arises; if, prior to 
the introduction of the 2017 Act, the Scots law of jus quaesitum tertio was ‘stuck in the 
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seventeenth century’, would the commixture of real and personal rights have appeared as 
anathema to Stair and his contemporaries as it does to the modern Scots legal commentator? 
To address this question, the development of the distinction between the Scottish law of things 
and the Scottish law of obligations must be considered. 
C. De Iurum Divisione 
Just as the work of Justinian and Gaius on de Rebus Incorporalibus has, at times, 
suffered from poor translation, so too has the term ius quod ad res pertinet been misrepresented 
by expression in the English language. It is common for English speakers to consider the ius 
quod ad res pertinet as the law pertaining to property, yet, as alluded, in Roman law the scope 
of this area of law was much wider. As indicated above, the ius quod ad res pertinet concerned 
the law pertaining to ‘things’, but this word has been said to be thought too ‘undignified’ to 
represent an important area of law such as the law of property167 and can only be regarded as 
more so in respect of the word’s actual purview in Roman law.168 
Although some commentators have suggested that the Roman jurists clearly had 
tangible, corporeal objects in mind when considering the ius quod ad res pertinet,169 this claim 
is not borne out by the true translation of the word res. The Romans ascribed as broad a 
meaning to the term as a modern English speaker may ascribe to the word ‘things’. Not only 
did the Romans evidently recognise res incorporalis170 and consider obligationes to be res,171 
but in fact the Roman conception of res was so broad as to include even non-patrimonial aspects 
of a person’s existence172 – that which defines ‘who a person is rather than what a person 
has’.173 In Prichard’s words, ‘one only has to investigate the term ‘respublica’ (often merely 
res, in fact) to see just how far the word could be stretched’174 and, as Lord MacKenzie 
observed, ‘in legal phraseology the word res or thing comprehends not only material objects, 
but also the actions of man’.175  
If the word ‘property’ may be termed mercurial,176 then the word ‘things’ is almost 
indescribable. It is plain that the word has a meaning beyond the corporeal; a concept such as 
that of jus quaesitum tertio is as much a ‘thing’ as a table is, for example. The Roman jurists 
evidently treat obligations as incorporeal juristic things which possessed an economic value.177 
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Accordingly, that the Roman lawyers and jurists dealt with obligationes as if they were simply 
things like any other res in commercio raises no conceptual difficulty; according to the 
Romanistic iurum divisione, they were simply such things. 
Although it is apparent that, in the mid-seventeenth century, Roman law was not 
regarded as binding on the Scottish courts,178 it is equally clear that it was certainly referred to 
on numerous occasions by the Court of Session and that Roman principles of law were used to 
settle some issues.179 In such instances, the Court did not rely on the citation of Roman law as 
authority so much as an indication of the most equitable manner to resolve the dispute at hand. 
Thus, the Romanistic iurum divisione was not necessarily made use of by the early Institutional 
writers simply because it was Roman in origin, but rather because this tripartite was seen as a 
‘natural’ order of law in this time period.180 The influence of the Roman law is manifest in the 
writings of both Craig and MacKenzie. The structure of Craig’s Jus Feudale181 clearly indicates 
that the institutional writer took the Institutional division of law into persons, things and actions 
into account when composing the treatise.182 The later writer, MacKenzie, made clear use of 
Roman law in his textbook on Scots law;183 indeed, so much so that Erskine appears to have 
(erroneously)184 believed that MacKenzie considered Roman law a part of the written law of 
Scotland.185 Even in the 21st century, there remains much truth in MacKenzie’s statement that 
‘[Roman] law is much respected generally, so it has great influence in Scotland except where 
our own express Laws or Customs have receded from it’.186 
Although Stair was initially critical of the Romanistic tripartite division,187 he 
nevertheless acknowledged its utility and made use of it, to a limited extent, in composing the 
second edition of his seminal work, the Institutions of the Law of Scotland188 (the last edition 
of the work published in the author’s lifetime). Thus, though the concept of jus quaesitum tertio 
did not attract the attention of Stair’s predecessors, Craig and MacKenzie,189 it is apparent that 
the thinking employed by the jurists of the seventeenth century remained grounded in the 
Romanistic tripartite division of law into the categories of persons, things and actions, and that 
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the more modern quadripartite Scots division of law into persons, things, obligations and 
actions was either unknown, or (at most) emergent and embryonic, in the period in which the 
concept of jus quaesitum tertio came to be developed. 
Accordingly, when Craig posits his statement that ‘the law of Scotland borrows directly 
from that of Rome in the chapters of paction, transaction, restitution, arbitration, servitudes, 
contracts – whether bonae fidei or stricti juris, nominate or innominate – eviction, pledge, 
tutory, legacies, actions, exceptions, obligations and, finally, reparation’,190 it must be borne 
in mind that, at the time of Craig’s writing, these matters fell to be governed by the law 
pertaining to things. Such is evident from the nature of the matters nominated by Craig; 
although servitudes and contracts can be distinguished, in modern law, by speaking of the 
division and distinction between real rights and personal rights, such a division clearly did not 
inform the fundaments of Scots law in its early stages. 
As such, it is of small wonder that so much of the law of jus quaesitum tertio appeared 
incongruous with the thinking typically applied by a modern Scots lawyer. The division of law 
into the rules pertaining to persons, things, obligations and actions that strikes the modern 
scholar as obvious would have been considered novel at the time of Stair’s writing. Prior to 
this point, the ius commune operated on the simpler Romanistic iurum divisione of persons, 
things and actions, with the notion of ‘obligationes’ forming but a small part of the law under 
the wider umbrella ius quod ad res pertinet. Accordingly, the reason for the often close 
connection between ‘real rights’ and ‘personal rights’ in matters pertaining to jus quaesitum 
tertio is obvious; if both kinds of ‘right’ are examples of obligationes in the Roman sense, then 
they are both juristically res incorporales and governed by the law pertaining to things, 
notwithstanding the fact that the law of obligations has emerged and existed as a distinct branch 
of law since early modern times.   
Although Scots law may have since receded from the Romanistic iurum divisione, it is 
apparent that there are still elements of the law in which a Romanistic analysis may provide 
the solution to perceived, yet ultimately illusory, problems. This is certainly true if Scots law 
truly is an example of a ‘living Roman legal system’, as the rhetoric of numerous legal 
commentators suggests. In any area of law which has become ‘stuck in’ a time period since 
past, while the wider law has moved on, it is evident that certain problems will strike the 
modern scholar as manifest, where a lawyer versed in the law of that period would see no such 
issue.  
D. CONCLUSION 
From the above, it may be concluded that, in Scots law, a jus quaesitum tertio was not, 
in fact, a ‘right’, but rather a ‘thing’ which, when created, existed subject to the rules of property 
law rather than the caprices of the law of obligations. This is so because the concept existed 
within the gap left between the law pertaining to things and the law of obligations when the 
latter became its own, distinct, branch of law according to the Scottish division of law. 
Thus, it is plain that if the beneficiary of a jus quaesitum tertio is understood as the 
owner (or prospective owner) of a res incorporalis created by an act of private law, then the 
simple proposition that a jus quaesitum tertio is a res rather than a right explains both why a 
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jus quaesitum tertio can be created to benefit an entity which did not exist at the time that the 
jus was created and additionally explains why, at common law, a jus quaesitum tertio cannot 
be altered or destroyed by its creators once it has been made. Furthermore, by distancing itself 
from the language of ‘rights’, this analysis provides a clear explanation for the reason that ‘real’ 
and ‘personal’ rights come into such close proximity in matters relating to jus quaesitum tertio; 
such a distinction did not exist in the classical ius quod ad res pertinet and so a concept such 
as jus quaesitum tertio, would not be equipped to operate in a manner sensitive to this 
separation.  
It is also ultimately submitted that the thesis espoused in this paper is consistent with 
Stair’s own analysis. If one accepts the view that a jus quaesitum tertio arises as a result of 
promise, then there is no need for one to be troubled by the supposed problems set out in the 
introduction, so long as one recognises ‘promise’ to be a kind of obligatio, and acknowledges 
that such obligationes may yet be conceptualised as res for certain purposes in law. The inter-
mingling of ‘real’ and ‘personal’ rights is not problematic on this analysis; indeed, it is apparent 
that the law pertaining to things may yet have some say in the governance of certain parts of 
the law of obligations and the chasm between ‘real rights’ and ‘personal rights’ may not be so 
wide as it may seem to the modern Scots or Civilian scholar.  
 It is consequently concluded that the phrase jus quaesitum tertio merits continued usage 
in the classroom, if not the courtroom – though, admittedly, the subject matter of those classes 
will likely be property law or Roman law, rather than the modern Scots law of contract. 
Although the use of ‘plain words’ incontrovertibly benefits everyone who comes into contact 
with the legal profession, it is important for Scottish legal professionals to retain, at the back 
of their minds, a certain understanding of whence our law came, if only so that they can 
continue to guide it on the right path in the future. 
 
 
